ABSTRACT European Union (EU) implementation research has neglected situations when member states go beyond the minimum requirements prescribed in EU directives (goldplating). The top-down focus on compliance insufficiently accounts for the fact that positive integration actually allows member states to transcend the EU's requirements to facilitate context-sensitive problem-solving. This study adopts a bottom-up implementation perspective. Moving beyond compliance, it introduces the concept of 'customization' to depict how transposition results in tailor-made solutions in a multi-level system. The study analyzes the hitherto unexplored veterinary drug regulations of four member states. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and formal theory evaluation, this paper assesses how policy and country-level factors interact. Results reveal the countries' different customization styles. The latter simultaneously reflect the interplay of domestic politics with institutions, and the 'fit' of EU regulatory modes with domestic, sectoral interventionist styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these fine-grained patterns of Europeanization.
Introduction
'The European experience shows that far-reaching economic integration can be achieved without suppressing cultural diversity and legitimate differences in national preferences.' Giandomenico Majone (1999: 309) . This paper analyzes how European Union (EU) member states adapt EU directives to domestic contexts during transposition. European integration entails that member states transfer their autonomy to a common institutional framework to allow for common policies.
To account for domestic circumstances, EU directives then delegate some decision-making processes to the transposing countries (Treib 2014) . The resulting diversity of domestic policies is studied by legal Europeanization scholars, who view transposition as a mechanism by which EU law impacts domestic regulations (Börzel and Risse 2012; Töller 2010) . EU implementation research has strongly emphasized the degree of (non-)compliance with EU directives, the timeliness and correctness of transposition, the amount of non-compliance and transposition rates (Toshkov 2010) . Despite their variety and sophistication (Angelova et al. 2012) , the concepts and explanations that have been proposed for transposition outcomes commonly focus on compliance, asking whether or not the translation into domestic law conforms to the EU directive (Treib 2014) .
Some argue that 'this focus insufficiently captures the implications of member states being part of a multi-level system' (Schmidt 2008: 299) . The question of compliance corresponds to a top-down view of implementation as hierarchical guidance. Although highly relevant, this approach 'tends to prejudge the EU as the main source of domestic change' (Börzel and Risse 2012: 2) . By contrast, bottom-up perspectives view implementation as decentralized problemsolving. Europeanization becomes the application of common solutions to shared problems, tailor-made to domestic circumstances (Pülzl and Treib 2007) . The analytic focus shifts toward the 'conditions [under which] directives do or do not allow for continuing national heterogeneity' (Töller 2010: 429) to facilitate context-sensitive problem-solving.
When member states go beyond the minimum requirements of European legislation -named 'gold-plating'-they are typically considered to hamper the enabling of markets. According to a widespread 'no gold-plating' policy, implementation should be restricted to what is necessary to comply with the EU's minimum requirements (Morris 2011; Voermans 2009 ).
Notwithstanding this, market-correcting measures allow member states to go further than the EU's minimum requirement (Jans et al. 2009 ). Reconciling integration with differences in national preferences fosters the EU's capacity to respond to the countries' cultural diversity (Majone 1999) , and enables countries to respond to domestic circumstances. The top-down focus on compliance and negative integration neglects this bottom-up aspect of the 'European experience' (ibid). Previous studies have therefore not addressed this phenomenon extensively (Voermans 2009 ).
This study moves beyond compliance (Schmidt 2008) and asks: how and why do fully compliant countries 'customize' EU directives? As the focus is on customization, this is hence not a compliance study. Customization refers to the additional regulatory density and stringency of the domestic regulations compared to the market-correcting EU directive (Knill et al. 2012) . The paper expands Europeanization research to a new sector (Angelova et al. 2012) . It draws on original data on veterinary drug regulations in France, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Austria as comparable and likely cases for customization. These countries all comply with the EU's rules to ensure the safety and exportability of their food products (Sager et al. 2011) . However, the domestic regulations differ considerably in the degree to which they transcend the EU directive.
Using fuzzy-set qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2000) to account for interactions, several propositions derived from compliance arguments on how the interplay between policy and country-level factors affects customization are formally evaluated. Results show that discretion matters and specify the conditions under which institutions mediate the consideration of domestic players' interests during transposition. Simultaneously, countries reinterpret EU directives depending on the 'fit' of EU regulatory modes with domestic, sectoral interventionist styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these more finegrained Europeanization patterns.
I now define the novel 'customization' concept. Subsequently, I discuss prominent implementation arguments to derive conditions for customization and hypotheses about their interplay. I then outline the research design before presenting my results, based on which I evaluate the hypotheses and conclude.
Defining customization
Diverse approaches of problem-solving are an intended result of decentralized implementation structures (Majone 1999; Treib 2014) . However, the remaining differences within the boundaries left by EU law have seldom received attention as a transposition outcome (Falkner et al. 2005: 140-159; Töller 2010) . Gold-plating refers to the 'non-literal', as opposed to 'literal', interpretation of EU directives (Steunenberg 2007) . It denotes all instances where at the national level more is being regulated than strictly required, by extending the scope, not taking full advantage of derogations, retaining higher domestic standards or implementing 'too' early (Jans et al. 2009 ). Case study evidence from the Netherlands and the UK suggests that environmental directives are rarely gold-plated (Jans et al. 2009; Morris 2011; Voermans 2009 ).
The term gold-plating has two weaknesses. First, it blurs the conceptual distinction between changes in policy outputs concerning the regulatory density or the policy's stringency (Knill and Lenschow 1998; Knill et al. 2012) . Second, by including both the early implementation and the non-literal interpretation of EU directives in the definition, gold-plating has not been clearly demarcated from non-compliance. Gold-plating thus retains a top-down connotation of unnecessary and potentially problematic 'over-implementation' (Falkner et al. 2005; Kaeding 2008; Mastenbroek 2005) .
However, in market-correcting domains, minimum harmonization essentially means that the member states may further interpret the EU's minimum requirement, except under conditions of full standardization (Jans et al. 2009; Voermans 2009 ). From a bottom-up perspective, countries 'customize' EU directives. Customization occurs when compliant countries use their leeway to adapt EU rules to domestic particularities. The transposing body might also consciously leave pre-existing domestic policies unchanged, if they conform to the EU policy (Treib 2014) . Customization means the degree to which the domestic regulations complement the EU directive with more or stricter rules than required. Customization can manifest itself as gold-plating (except for early implementation), but has two dimensions (Knill et al. 2012 ).
Customization can refer to the formal regulatory density of the domestic regulations. Density means the amount of additional rules that concretize the EU directive ('level of detail'; Versluis 2003) . Stringency depicts the substantial additional restrictiveness of the domestic rule. Restrictiveness means the number of additional restrictions of the substantial freedom left to policy addressees in personal, substantive, or temporal scope (Knill et al. 2012 ).
Transposition studies usually aggregate outcomes at the level of directives (Angelova et al. 2012 ). However, directives regulate diverse issues, which typically address different target groups and subsectors and are transposed into different national legislations, sometimes by several legislative bodies. Hence, single issues are a more relevant unit of analysis than directives (Toshkov 2010) . I use the terms 'regulations' or 'policies' interchangeably to denote a set of techniques by which public actors 'wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change' concerning a specific issue (Vedung 1998: 21 
Explaining customization
Top-down perspectives assume a direct link between European policies and domestic outcomes (Pülzl and Treib 2007) . Bottom-up arguments have shifted the attention to countrylevel factors (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) . Recent studies emphasize the complex causal interactions of structural and agency-related factors behind transposition (for recent overviews see Angelova et al. [2012] ; Perkins and Neumayer [2007] ; Toshkov [2010] ; Treib [2014] ). In this third tradition, I discuss how the interplay of both policy and domestic factors might affect customization (Di Lucia and Kronsell 2010; Steunenberg 2007) . For the sake of cumulativeness, I revisit prominent compliance arguments potentially relevant for customization that received considerable and conclusive empirical support. Results will show whether they treat the distinct features of customization well.
EU regulatory mode
Regulatory leeway matters for implementation (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Töller 2010 ). Knill and Lenschow (2003) distinguish EU governance modes through their level of obligation and the amount of discretion granted. Referring to the latter, inflexible instruments in (by definition obligatory) directives entail detailed substantive or procedural rules.
Conversely, flexible instruments in directives are legally binding, but define only broad goals, offer exemption and derogation possibilities or several policy options. Flexible instruments grant implementers more discretion than inflexible instruments to respond to domestic problem constellations ). Vaguer measures provide domestic policy makers with opportunities to realize their interests. EU regulatory modes can thus be unresponsive to domestic adaptation (inflexible instruments), or display differing degrees or responsiveness (flexible instruments). Discretion intuitively appears a prerequisite for customization:
H1: A responsive EU regulatory mode is a necessary condition for extensive customization.
H2: Inflexible instruments are typically not or hardly customized. 3
However, flexible instruments might result due to member states defending their status quo during EU negotiations. Domestic policy diversity would then produce flexible instruments, and not vice versa. In contrast, the EU decision-making processes for the three directives under analysis were characterized by low politicization and a widespread need for harmonization.
4
Issue salience
Given the enormous number of EU directives, domestic actors pick and choose where to focus their attention (Versluis 2003) . Less salient regulations are ignored (Knill and Lenschow 1998; Toshkov 2010 ) and thus rather not customized. Salience refers to the visibility of and the importance attached to a topic, the main indicator being public attention. Salience can indicate either the high importance of a policy or its political contestation (Versluis 2003) .
Domestic resistance
EU policies may lead to political struggles between domestic players (Falkner et al. 2005; Knill and Lenschow 1998; Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2014 ). Domestic opposition (Steunenberg 2007; Toshkow 2010) should foster differentiated domestic rules designed to meet the stakeholders' needs. Or this can lead to more restrictive rules, if the opposition deems the EU policy too lax. Resistance means that at least one main target group with some power to influence domestic policy-making with resources and/or lobbying activities opposes the EU policy.
Institutions
Institutional veto points are stages in the decision-making process on which, and institutional veto players individual or collective actors whose, agreement is formally required for transposition. Such institutions empower or constrain administrative, societal and political actors to pursue their interests (Mastenbroek 2005; Treib 2014; Tsebelis 1995) . This should facilitate an extensive customization (Falkner et al. 2005) . Policy-specific consultation processes without parliamentary involvement serve the same function (Steunenberg 2007; Töller 2010) . I define veto points as the combination of the degree of decentralization (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006; Versluis 2003) , bicameralism, and corporatism. Since transposition often bypasses the political arena, corporatism becomes as important as decentralization and bicameralism.
Arguments that 'bring domestic politics back in' (Mastenbroek 2005 (Mastenbroek : 1110 emphasize the interplay of domestic interests and institutions. Domestic opposition can only be influential when institutions do not effectively shelter the policy-making body from societal demands (Haverland 2000; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 2010 
Domestic, sectoral interventionist styles
Administrative bodies as policy makers conduct a large part of the transposition process (Steunenberg 2007; Töller 2010) . 'Constructivist' arguments assume that these bodies follow a logic of appropriateness, hence acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed and anticipated and associate particular identities to particular situations (March and Olsen 1998 Perkins and Neumayer (2007) suggest that the policymaking preferences of national governments matter (see also Di Lucia and Kronsell [2010] ; Treib [2014: 18] ). In my analysis I am particularly interested in patterns of established state-society relations (Treib 2014: 24) .
Domestic, sectoral interventionist styles represent such habits concerning the relationship between state and individuals, which manifests itself in the use of coercion through policy instruments (Sager 2009 
Data
The domestic regulations of single issues in a market-correcting sector serve as the units of analysis for customization. I now discuss why the sector of veterinary drugs regulations is illustrative, the policy issues of dispensing and administration are likely cases, and the countries France, UK, Germany and Austria are comparable cases for customization.
Europeanization research needs to expand to new policy sectors (Angelova et al. 2012 ). The more contextually similar the analyzed countries are, the more potential intervening factors can be controlled for (Rihoux and Ragin 2009 ). I compare the domestic regulations of Austria, Germany, France and the UK in 2011 (N = 76). These countries share a tendency toward low compliance (Falkner et al. 2005) , similar regulatory contexts and functional problems. Food safety scandals triggered the relevance of veterinary drug regulations, and livestock farming has a similar significance for agriculture: the value added to the gross domestic product by agriculture was between 1 and 4.7, but below EU average in 2000. All domestic regulations analyzed here were subject to extensive revisions since the EU directives were issued (Sager et al. 2011: 301-302 ).
The original case study evidence for this study was collected for the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (Sager et al. 2011) . Methods comprised an analysis of legal documents, policy documents, secondary literature, telephone interviews and written questionnaires with agents of relevant stakeholder groups and the public administration. QCA understands variables as sets in which every case has a certain membership. The calibration process entails the definition of anchors for set membership, based on theoretical and substantive knowledge. Fuzzy sets allow for degrees of (non-)membership scores. These can vary between full membership (score 1, e.g. extensive customization) and full nonmembership (score 0, e.g. no customization). The dichotomous difference 'in kind' is indicated by the crossover point (score 0.5). Values above 0.5 indicate that a case is more a member than a non-member in the set (e.g., rather or fully extensive customization), yet to differing degrees. Values below 0.5 indicate the opposite, e.g., rather or fully limited customization (Ragin 2000 Raw consistency levels were chosen according to 'gaps' in the raw consistency values and the presence of contradictory cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 127f, 143ff) . Contradictory cases are 'more in than out' in the set of explanatory factors, but 'more out than in' the outcome set; thus, the explanation was not sufficient for the outcome.
Method
I apply the Enhanced Standard Analysis procedure and rely on the intermediate solution term.
I hence make theoretically informed directional expectations for single conditions, and I ensure that no combination of conditions is assumed to imply both extensive and limited customization. Online appendix B displays the truth tables, the directional expectations, the complex and parsimonious solution terms, indications on limited diversity, untenable and simplifying assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 167-211 
Results
Administration policies tend to be more salient and disputed, but customized less extensively than dispensing policies. Figure 1 illustrates the diversity of the domestic settings. Values above 0.5 indicate that the specific feature is more often present than absent, and to which degree. The countries display different interventionist styles and 'customization styles'.
Austria and France are comparable. The policies typically face a rather low amount of domestic resistance. Austria, as a federal state, has many veto points but few veto players. The opposite is the case in the centralized state of France. In line with the two countries' rather coercive interventionist traditions, the EU policies are rendered slightly more restrictive, but not differentiated extensively.
--Insert figure 1 here--Germany and the UK provide two almost ideal-typical counterexamples. The federal state of Germany is the only country where veterinary drug issues are highly salient and contested on average. Simultaneously many veto points and players prevail. In accordance with its highly coercive interventionist style, Germany most often implements more restrictive domestic rules than necessary and differentiates EU directives. By contrast, in the centralized state of the UK domestic resistance tends to be rather limited and few veto points and players exist.
Consistent with previous evidence (Jans et al. 2009; Morris 2011) , the UK more rarely innovatively interprets and sometimes amends EU policies than the other countries, mainly to maintain its liberal regulatory approach that stresses individual responsibility, based on recommendations of good practice.
No single necessary condition for the outcome was found (table B2, online appendix).
Hypothesis 1 is thus refuted. Table 1 Commission found monopolies in the supply of prescription drugs (Sager et al. 2011: 272) .
To enhance freedom of competition, the UK administration interpreted the EU rule creatively:
Besides veterinarians, other actors were granted permission to prescribe certain categories of veterinary drugs. 
Theory evaluation
I now discuss the five hypotheses following Ragin's principles of theory evaluation (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 295-305) . The scenarios expected and those not are compared with the scenarios that were empirically (not) observed to answer three questions:
first, which parts of the theory are supported by the findings? These are the areas shaded white in the tables 2 and 3 below. Second, in which direction should theory be expanded (grey areas)? Third, which parts of the theory need to be dropped (dark areas)? Online appendix C presents the underlying formal details.
-- Insert table 2 here---Insert table 3 here -
The first key result is that discretion matters for customization (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Toshkov 2010 (Sager et al. 2014 ). This 'refined domestic politics' mechanism is, however, not the only path to extensive customization.
In fact, third, the countries interpret EU norms depending on their fit with their domestic style 
Conclusions
The customization concept overcomes the conceptual shortcomings of the term 'gold-plating'
and offers a differentiated bottom-up perspective on different ways EU member states problem-solve (Pülzl and Treib 2007) . It captures how transposition results in tailor-made solutions in a multi-level system (Schmidt 2008) . Despite an apparent 'no gold-plating policy' in the EU (Jans et al. 2009 ) and the previously stated rareness of the phenomenon (Morris 2011; Voermans 2009 ), results illustrate the considerable styles through which EU veterinary drugs directives are customized to fit domestic contexts. Germany, Austria, France and the UK issued market-correcting solutions that exceed the EU directive in their density or stringency (Knill et al. 2012 ) to secure animal health and food safety in the European single market.
This study moves EU implementation and QCA research design forward in several ways.
First, the customization concept offers an alternative way to measure how much European law influences national policy-making (Töller 2010) . Second, relevant factors have proven to differ between single policy issues, rather than whole directives, as units of analysis (Toshkov 2010 ). Third, this study expands implementation research to the veterinary drugs sector (Treib 2014) . Fourth, only the interplay between both policy-specific and country-level factors has aptly illuminated how EU policy structures national policy outcomes (Sager et al. 2014; Steunenberg 2007) . Fifth, the findings indicate that domestic, sectoral interventionist styles matter for transposition (Perkins and Neumayer 2007; Vedung 1998) . Finally, applying formal theory evaluation to assess set-theoretic hypotheses has considerably eased the results' interpretation.
The results suggest that to a limited extent, the EU can effectively steer how far countries depart from the EU template (Knill and Lenschow 2003; Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009; Treib et al. 2007) . Findings support the 'domestic politics' hypothesis that domestic interests in interaction with institutions influence transposition, but delimit its scope to the presence of flexible EU instruments and salient issues (Falkner et al. 2005; Mastenbroek 2005; Steunenberg 2007; Versluis 2003) . The study thus specifies conditions under which institutions mediate the consideration of societal interests (Haverland 2000; Toshkov 2010 ).
Simultaneously, I find considerable evidence that the customization of EU directives partly obeys a logic of appropriateness. The 'fit' between the styles of state intervention of the EU and the transposing countries provokes different domestic interpretations of EU directives (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006) . This happens in interaction with domestic political and institutional factors. The findings invite for a further exploration of the relationship between different logics of action of EU member states (March and Olsen 1998) .
Paradoxically, the arguments derived from compliance research have not been well suited to explain 'compliance' with the EU's 'no gold-plating' policy. To gain a better understanding of this phenomenon, deviant cases should be explored more in-depth (Schneider and Wagemann 2012) . Possible explanations include EU decision-making processes (Töller 2010; Toshkov 2010) , the domestic administrations' substantive preferences, and implementation and enforcement mechanisms (Treib 2014; Versluis 2003) . These factors were neglected in this study. This study is based on a purposive sample of market-correcting issues that illustrate customization. It deliberately applies a modest view on generalization (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) : it remains to be tested whether the present results can travel to different policies or countries.
The customization concept fruitfully sheds light on the aspect of diversity in what Majone (1999) called the 'European experience'. We evidently need to move beyond compliance (Sager et al. 2014) to gain a fuller understanding of these often neglected, more fine-grained patterns of Europeanization. Diversity is inherent in multi-level governance. More research on the causes and implications of diversity for the policies' later enforcement, application and effectiveness is needed to understand how shared policy problems are jointly resolved in the EU. :d2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, a4 AU:d2, 6, 7 FR:d1, 2, 10, a4, 5 GE:d2, 4, 7, 10, a4 UK:d2, 6, 12 FR:d6, 7, 9, 12, 13, a1, 3, d4, 8 GE:d6, 12, 13, a1 AU:d1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13 GE:d1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, a4, 5 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 67ff, 308) .
